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1The Semantics of Dialogue
Jonathan Ginzburg
1.1 Introduction
The semantics of dialogue is a fundamental topic for a number of reasons.
First, dialogue is the primary medium of language use, phylogenetically
and ontogenetically. Second, studying dialogue forces one to a particu-
larly careful study of the nature of context. The context has a role to
play in determining what one can or should say at a given point and also
how to say it. Conversely, it aﬀords the interlocutors a very impressive
economy of expression—there is much subtlety that can be achieved with
relatively little eﬀort drawing simply on material that is in the context.
Consequently, two themes will drive this article, relating to two fun-
damental problems a semantic analysis in dialogue has to tackle:
(1) a. Conversational relevance: given that a conversation is in a
certain state, what utterances can be produced coherently by each
conversational participant in that state?
b. Conversational meaning: what conversational states are appro-
priate for a given word/construction and what import will that
word have in such a state?
Conversational Relevance is without doubt a very fundamental and
diﬃcult problem. It is closely connected to the Turing test and solving
this problem in full generality is, as Turing pointed out, a possible ba-
sis for understanding the nature of intelligence (Turing (1950), see also
 Lupkowski and Wi´sniewski (2011)). But is it a semantic, as opposed to a
pragmatic problem or one connected to generalized notions of cognition?
We will not deal with this issue of territorial demarcation in anything
but passing (see also the article on the semantics/pragmatics in this
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volume). Nonetheless, we will oﬀer a detailed empirical and theoretical
analysis of the components of conversational relevance.
Conversational meaning is semantic enough, but the obvious question
one might ask is—why conversational? Why should we consider meaning
in the context of conversations? One might turn the question on its
head and ask, noting, as I already have above, that conversation is the
primary linguistic medium in which language evolved and existed for
millenia and that it is the setting in which language is acquired: how
could we not take conversation as the basic setting for semantic theory?
I think this perspective is highly attractive—I have oﬀered some evidence
for it in Ginzburg (2012) and establishing this point—more generally
that grammar should be viewed as characterizing talk in interaction—is
the main topic of Ginzburg and Poesio (2014). For current purposes, it
will suﬃce to point to the existence of various words and constructions
whose import is tied to a conversational setting. These in themselves
justify the need for at least some of semantics to be conversationally
oriented. In section 1.5 we will also encounter phenomena from dialogue
that motivate an incremental view of semantic composition.
The structure of this article is as follows: I start by pointing to work
in the philosophy of language, pragmatics, cognitive psychology, and
conversational analysis, which provides current formal work on dialogue
with key phenomena and concepts. I then point to a number of core
phenomena that linguistic theories of dialogue need to account for. I
subsequently sketch an account of certain of these phenomena in con-
temporary dialogue frameworks. Finally, I point to a number of addi-
tional phenomena that seem to require signiﬁcant modiﬁcations of our
view of semantics, context, and language.
1.2 Antecedents of Formal Dialogue Theory
1.2.1 Language is or could be dialogical
Wittgenstein (1953) introduced the notion of a language game. Now the
notion of language game is no more deﬁnite than the notion of a game
simpliciter, which Wittgenstein put forward as an example of a concept
diﬃcult to characterize in hard and fast terms. Still a language game
can be viewed as a type of interaction involving language use within a
more or less restricted set of associated actions. For dialogue researchers
it is important for at least two reasons. First, in discussing the hypo-
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thetical ‘builder’s language’ Wittgenstein illustrates that within a spe-
ciﬁc domain ‘non-canonical’ utterances, particularly non-sentential ones
such as ‘Slab!’ or ‘Beam!’, can be as canonical or even more natural
than fully spelled out, sentential utterances. Indeed Wittgenstein pro-
vides one of the ﬁrst challenges to the ‘sententialist’ view of ellipsis that
will subsequently, from the 1960s onwards, predominate in generative
grammar:
But what about this: is the call ”Slab I” in example (2) a sentence or a word?
If a word, surely it has not the same meaning as the like- sounding word
of our ordinary language, for in [section 2] it is a call. But if a sentence, it
is surely not the elliptical sentence: “Slab” of our language. As far as the
ﬁrst question goes you can call “Slabl” a word and also a sentence; perhaps
it could be appropriately called a ’degenerate sentence’ (as one speaks of a
degenerate hyperbola); in fact it is our ’elliptical’ sentence. But that is surely
only a shortened form of the sentence ”Bring me a slab”, and there is no such
sentence in example (2). But why should I not on the contrary have called the
sentence ”Bring me a slab” a lengthening of the sentence ”Slab”? Because if
you shout ”Slab!” you really mean: ”Bring me a slab”. But how do you do this:
how do you mean that while you say ”Slabl”? Do you say the unshortened
sentence to yourself? . . . (Wittgenstein (1953), section 19)
Tying utterance interpretation to facts characteristic of speciﬁc do-
mains provides a potential way of dealing with a variety of actually
occurring non sentential utterances (NSUs) in various domains:
(2) a. [A advances to bar, addresses barman] A: A Franziskaner and a
Duwel.
b. (1) ‘Your name?’ asked Holmes.
(2) ‘Patrick Cairns.’
(3) ‘Harpooner?’
(4) ‘Yes, sir. (5) Twenty six voyages.’
(6) ‘Dundee, I suppose?’
(7) ‘Yes, sir.’ (‘Black Peter’, Sir Arthur Conan-Doyle).
More generally, it opens up the way to talk about domain speciﬁcity
of language. Variation is a big, perhaps one of the biggest issues in con-
temporary sociolinguistics (Tagliamonte (2006)). This view of language
lies at present in big contrast to the domain independent view almost
universally assumed in formal grammar of most stripes. However, work-
ers on speech recognition assume such a view via the notion of language
model (Chelba (2010)). Given that one of the main concerns of dialogue is
characterizing relevance and that, as demonstrated in (2), this is clearly
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domain relative, the importance of a language game perspective is evi-
dent.
In fact, there is a long tradition predating Wittgenstein by centuries
of logic games or formal dialectic. This tradition, expunged from main-
stream attention in post-Fregean logic until recently, is documented in
Hamblin (1970) and has been active in argumentation theory (Walton
(2011)). This perspective is quite narrower than the Wittgensteinian,
with a normative intent, but more directly tractable. Thus, Hamblin’s
Why-Because System with Questions (Hamblin (1970) pp. 265–276 can
be viewed as one of the ﬁrst modern attempts to provide a formal de-
scription of two person discussion: moves are characterized in terms of
formulas of propositional logic which can aﬀect a set of commitments. In
addition to moves corresponding to assertion and the posing of alterna-
tive questions, the system provides for moves that elicit the justiﬁcation
of an assertion, retraction, and a request to resolve an inconsistency.
1.2.2 Meaning from rationality
From our current perspective, Gricean pragmatics (Grice (1989)) is very
much focussed on the issue of Conversational Relevance: Grice’s maxims
constitute a quasi-calculus for establishing what utterance to select at
a given point in a conversation. And, consequently, what inferences to
draw in case this selection does not get realized in practice.
The big gaping hole in Grice’s account, one which he was fully aware
of, was the lack of substance concerning the maxim of Relevance. Two
crucial ingredients are missing: an explicit notion of current conversa-
tional state and a means for generating the range of potentially relevant
contributions. While there has been much insightful work in mainstream
pragmatics since Grice, whether closely following Grice (e.g. Levinson
(2000)) or radically changing his vision (e.g. Relevance Theory, Sperber
and Wilson (1986))), it has not ﬁlled these lacunes.
On the other hand for workers on the semantics of dialogue, Grice
has provided inspiration in signiﬁcant ways. Groenendijk (2006) shows
how using a relatively simple extension of ﬁrst order logic that contains
also questions can enable one to simultaneously deﬁne notions of Qual-
ity, Quantity and Relevance (his technical term is pertinence.) Dekker
(2006), on the basis of a synthesis of dynamic semantics, Gricean prag-
matics, and relevance theory, shows how to characterize the optimality
of a discourse. This general strategy is taken a step further in Inquisi-
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tive Semantics (Groenendijk (2009); Groenendijk and Roelofsen (2009)),
discussed in detail in the article on Questions (this volume...)
As we discuss in section 1.4, accounts which emphasize a notion of
Questions–Under–Discussion (QUD) as fundamental to context oﬀer de-
tailed explications of relevance, some of which emphasize Gricean ratio-
nality and cooperativeness (e.g. early Asher and Lacarides, Roberts),
others somewhat more wary (e.g. Ginzburg, later Asher and Lacarides).
1.2.3 Structure from Interaction
A third tradition, Conversational Analysis (CA) (Sacks et al. (1974);
Schegloﬀ et al. (1977); Schegloﬀ (1987)), puts interaction as the primary
scene for linguistic use. CA’s contributions to developing a theory of
dialogue address primarily move relevance:
• adjacency pairs: CA provides extensive evidence for the existence
of strong preference for a certain class of responses (second part pairs)
as follow ups to a given class of first part pairs:
(3) a. A:Who left; B: Bill (query/reply)
b. A: Open the window please! B: Sure (command/acceptance)
c. A: Hi! B: Hiya! (greeting/counter-greeting)
• Repair: perhaps an even more important contribution of CA is in-
troducing the notion of repair:
By ‘repair’ we refer to eﬀorts to deal with trouble in speaking, hearing, or
understanding talk in interaction. ‘Trouble’ includes such occurrences as
misarticulations, malapropisms, use of a “wrong” word, unavailability of
a word when needed, failure to hear or to be heard, trouble on the part
of the recipient in understanding, incorrect understandings by recipients,
and various others. Because anything in talk can be a source of trouble,
everything in conversation is, in principle, “repairable”. (Schegloﬀ (1987),
p. 210)
Schegloﬀ et al. (1977) show that there are many commonalities be-
tween self-repair (A repairing her own utterance) and other repair (B
repairing A’s utterance.). This work was the ﬁrst of many to show the
regularity of repair, still very much neglected in generative and formal
work, possibly under the inﬂuence of the competence/performance dis-
tinction, which consigns most self-repair to the performance dustbin.
Both self-repair and other-repair have subsequently been the object
of much study by researchers in other disciplines: as we discuss in
sections 1.3.3 and 1.5.1 respectively, self-repair by psychologists and
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speech scientists, whereas other-repair by HCI and dialogue system
designers and by developmental psychologists.
• Turn Taking: a third crucial contribution of CA was to initiate the
study of turn taking in Sacks et al. (1974). A remarkable feature of con-
versation is that there are relatively few overlaps but at the same time
correspondingly few intervals of extended silence. Indeed gaps longer
than 600 msec are understood to imply that a dispreferred response
will be supplied and gaps longer than 1500 msec are relatively rare.
Sacks, Jeﬀerson, and Schegloﬀ proposed a basic principle for determin-
ing how a next turn is assigned interactively, as a basis for explaining
the eﬃcacy of the turn taking system. This principle has withstood
the ravages of time, serving as the basis for detailed psycholinguistic
experimentation (see e.g. De Ruiter et al. (2006)) and for typological
investigations (e.g. Stivers et al. (2009)), which provide some evidence
for the account’s cross-linguistic and cross-cultural validity.
1.3 Core Dialogue Phenomena
In this section I list some phenomena any theory of dialogue needs to
account for or underpin other modules’ accounts thereof, in line with
the driving issues in (1).
1.3.1 ‘Direct’ Relevance
The ﬁrst such phenomenon, at the level of utterance content, is charac-
terizing what one might call direct relevance. That is, the relationship
that holds between moves m1 and m2 when m2 constitutes a direct
response to m1. While the CA literature oﬀers some data on this is-
sue when adjacency pairs are discussed, this is an area that has been
studied systematically primarily in the domain of question/answer rela-
tions (i.e. where m1 is a query move and m2 is assertoric.). Here notions
such as partial answerhood (Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984)), About-
ness (Ginzburg (1995a); Ginzburg and Sag (2000)), and licensing (Groe-
nendijk (2006)).
(4) a. Jo: When is the train leaving?
Carrie: At 2:58, 17.333398 seconds, according to our caesium clock./At
2:58./In about an hour./In a short while.
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b. Chris: Did Merle leave?
Kim: Yes./Probably./It’s not likely./No.
c. Sandy: Who will help the President?
Tracy: His close friends./Few people we know./Merle Africa or
Merle Haggard.
(Ginzburg and Sag (2000)’s example (103))
More recently, Ginzburg (Ginzburg (1996, 2012)) suggested that the
appropriate notion for ‘direct’ responses to queries (his notion of a q–
speciﬁc utterance, relative to a question q) should encapsulate both an-
swer responses together with query responses. The idea being that when-
ever an issue is being addressed there can be ‘direct responses’ of both
assertoric and interrogative nature. A similar intuition seems to underlie
the notion of compliance (Groenendijk and Roelofsen (2009)).
(5) a. A: Bo left. B: Right/Did he?/Isn’t he still around?
b. A: Who shall we invite to the party? B: Jack and Jill./Who is
available?
This raises in a particular the issue of how to characterize the range of
queries that can coherently follow a query. A large proportion of these
are clariﬁcation requests, discussed in section 1.3.3 and these do not
address the query as such. However, results from a corpus study of the
BNC ( Lupkowski and Ginzburg (2014)), which oﬀers a comprehensive
characterization of such responses, show the existence of a number of
other classes, including the following three:a
(6) a. Dependent questions: A: Do you want me to <pause> push
it round?
B: Is it really disturbing you? [BNC, FM1, 679–680]
(cf. Whether I want you to push it depends on whether it really
disturbs you.)
b. Situationally pertinent questions: A: Well do you wanna go
down and have a look at that now?
<pause> While there’s workmen there?
B: Why haven’t they ﬁnished yet? [BNC, KCF, 617–619]
a Many attested examples in this article come from the British National Corpus
(BNC, Aston and Barnard (1998)). I use the convention of referring to the file
from which it is extracted, e.g., K7D and usually also the line number within
that file.
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c. Rebound questions: A: Yeah what was your answer?
B: What was yours? [BNC, KP3, 636–637]
Apart from clariﬁcation questions, dependent questions are by far the
commonest class of query response—their existence was pointed out by
(Carlson (1983)). The other two classes, somewhat less common, are not
‘meta’ as such —they, pretheoretically, address the subject matter as-
sociated with the query. Rebound questions, which do indeed strongly
implicate reluctance to address the issue originally raised, go against
any idea that reduces query response felicity to their being a means of
ﬁnding an answer to the initial query, as in e.g. (Asher and Lascarides
(2003)); indeed while their intended eﬀect of imposing a distinct issue
is easy to characterize, the range of such questions is diﬃcult to char-
acterize a priori. Situationally pertinent questions illustrate that the
‘queried situation’, not merely the ‘queried predicate’ can be signiﬁcant
in calculating a possible (query) response.
1.3.2 Interjections and Non Sentential Utterances
One characteristic of conversation is the prevalence of utterances with-
out an overt predicate. A semantics for dialogue needs to explain the
meaning (= felicity and import) of such utterances. From among these
one can mention initially sentential fragments—predicateless utterances
whose content is propositional or interrogatory. Semantically oriented
taxonomies for this class and corpus studies based on them can be found
in (Ferna´ndez and Ginzburg (2002); Schlangen (2003)). Common types
of NSUs are exempliﬁed in bold face in (7):
(7)
a. Ann: Can you hear the birds singing? Listen. James: Er (pause)
yeah. Ann: Can you hear? Bryony: I hear birds singing. Ann: You
can hear the birds singing. Yes. (BNC, KB8)
b. Ann: Well put it on the draining board and I’ll wash it and then
put it back (pause) James: Right, I’ll see ya tonight Ann: Mhm,
mhm (pause) James: Tarrah Ann: mm, bye [conversation ends]
(BNC, KB6)
c. A: Who’s that?
B: My Aunty Peggy [last or full name]. My dad’s sister. [BNC,
G58, 33–35]
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d. Tim: Those pink things that af after we had our lunch. Dorothy:
Pink things? Tim: Yeah. Er those things in that bottle. Dorothy:
Oh I know what you mean. For your throat? (BNC, KBW)
e. Cherrilyn: Are you still (pause) erm (pause) going to Bristol
(pause) on Monday? Fiona: Dunno. Cherrilyn:No? Fiona: I dunno.
Doubt it, why? (=Why do you ask if I’m going to Bristol?) (BNC,
KBL)
A second class of predicate-less utterances are interjections (for de-
scriptive work see e.g. Schelfhout et al. (2005); Norrick (2009), for formal
treatments of some case studies see Kaplan (1999); Jayez (2004); Potts
(2007); McCready (2008)), which as (8) makes clear fulﬁll a variety of
functions, including conversation initiation and closing, expressing emo-
tional attitudes towards events, and attention-getting devices:
(8) a. Mark: that’s poison oak. Christa: damn. I don’t want that on
my body. Longman Grammar of Spoken American English Corpus
(LSWEC-AC) Norrick (2009), p. 869
b. A: because they go at six ﬁfty a pop. c: ((laughs)) b: god I know.
London Lund Corpus (Svartvik and Quirk (1980), 1-10) example
from Norrick (2009), p. 877
c. Cooper: can I have a bite of that cookie? Sara: hey they’re low
calorie. you can have the whole cookie. Cooper: thank you. LSWEC-
AC, Norrick (2009), p. 881
Sentential fragments and interjections pose various challenges both
to the semantics and to the organization of the grammar. The most
basic challenge is to ensure that context is organized so as to enable
resolution of the content and its relevance in the context. There is the
pervasive problem that in many cases deciding what the content on a
given use is not straightforward and how many distinct senses to reify, as
already noted by Wittgenstein. I will exemplify this below with meta-
communicative utterances. For now, I illustrate the issue of relevance
speciﬁcation in a case where the content resolution is straightforward.
The Arabic word ‘marxabteyn’ is used exclusively as a response to an
initial greeting, indeed typically where the initial greeting had the form
‘marxaba’ (‘marxabteyn’ is the dual form of ‘marxaba’).. Thus, in its
lexical speciﬁcation we need to ﬁnd a way to encode this information.
This already hints that the notion of context required must be rich
and structured, intrinsically more than the dynamic notions introduced
to explicate textual meaning in the 1990s (see the articles on theories
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of discourse, dynamic semantics). Indeed, NSUs exhibit varying degrees
of structural parallelism between the source and the target. For exam-
ple, both short answers and sluicing cross-linguistically requires cross-
categorial concord between the antecedent wh-phrase and the target (as
ﬁrst pointed out, respectively, by Morgan (1973); Ross (1969)), whereas
a reprise fragment on its intended content reading requires segmental
phonological identity between source and target (Ginzburg and Cooper
(2004)):
(9) a. A: lemi hixmeta? B: #moti/lemoti.
To-who ﬂattered-2nd-sg? moti/to-moti
A: Who did you ﬂatter? B: Moti.
b. A: et mi sˇibaxt? B: et moti/#lemoti.
def-acc who praised-2nd-sg? def-acc moti/to-moti
A: Who did you praise? B: Moti.
c. A: Did Bo leave? B: Bo? (Intended content reading:Who are you
referring to? or Who do you mean?) /Max? (lacks intended
content reading; can only mean: Are you referring to Max?)
Since such parallelism can be carried across a number of turns, par-
ticularly in multi-party dialogue (Ginzburg and Ferna´ndez (2005)), this
means that information needed to ensure parallelism is satisﬁed needs
to be projected into context.
1.3.3 Other repair
The pervasiveness of NSUs and interjections in dialogue is a symptom of
the richness of context available to the interlocuters. There is another as-
pect which is absolutely fundamental to dialogue and concomitantly still
missing from most formal approaches to semantics—metacommunicative
interaction.
If all goes well with an utterance, we’re rarely aware of the communica-
tive process, though it’s always there ticking in the background, evinced
by the constant stream of backchanelling utterances and gestures pro-
duced by the participants of a conversation (for empirical work on back
channels see e.g. Novick and Sutton (1994); Muller and Prevot (2003);
Nakano et al. (2003) . Switch that oﬀ and bizarreness ensues. This pro-
cess, establishing that the most recent move has been understood to the
satisfaction of the conversationalists, has come to be known as ground-
ing, following extensive empirical work by Herb Clark and his collabora-
tors (Clark and Schaefer (1989); Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986); Clark
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(1996)). A particularly detailed semantic theory of grounding has been
developed in the PTT (not an acronym!) framework, discussed further
below in section 1.4.3. One concrete task for a dialogical theory is to
account for the potential for and meaning of acknowledgement phrases,
as in (10), either once the the utterance is completed, as in (10a), or
concurrently with the utterance as in (10b):
(10) a. Tommy: So Dalmally I should safely say was my ﬁrst schooling.
Even though I was about eight and a half. Anon 1: Mm. Now your
father was the the stocker at Tormore is that right ? (BNC, K7D)
b. A: Move the train . . .
B: Aha
A:. . . from Avon . . .
B: Right
A:. . . to Danville. (Adapted from the Trains corpus, Allen et al.
(1995))
An additional task is to characterize the range of (potential) presuppo-
sitions emerging in the aftermath of an utterance, whose subject matter
concerns both content and form:
(11) a. A: Did Mark send you a love letter?
b. B: No, though it’s interesting that you refer to Mark/my
brother/our friend
c. B: No, though it’s interesting that you mention sending
d. B: No, though it’s interesting that you ask a question contain-
ing seven words.
e. B: No, though it’s interesting that the final two words you
just uttered start with ‘l’
Developing a semantic theory that can fully accommodate the chal-
lenges of grounding is far from straightforward. A more radical chal-
lenge, nonetheless, is to explicate what goes on when an addressee cannot
ground her interlocutor’s utterance.
More radical because this ultimately leads to seemingly radical conclu-
sions of an intrinsic semantic indeterminacy (Davidson (1986)): in such a
situation the public context is no longer identical for the interlocutors—
the original speaker can carry on, blissfully unaware that a problem
exists, utilizing a ‘grounded context’, whereas if the original addressee
takes over the context is shifted to one which underwrites a clarification
request. This potential context–splitting is illustrated in (12), originally
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discussed in (Ginzburg (1997)). (12) illustrates that the contextual pos-
sibilities for resolving the fragment ‘Bo?’ are distinct for the original
speaker A and the original addressee B. Whereas there is one common
possibility, the short answer reading, only B has the two clariﬁcation re-
quest readings, whereas only A has a self-correction reading, albeit one
that probably requires an additional elaboratory follow up:
(12)
a. A: Who does Bo admire? B: Bo?
Reading 1 (short answer): Does Bo admire Bo?
Reading 2 (clausal confirmation): Are you asking who BO (of
all people) admires?;
Reading 2 (intended content ): Who do you mean ‘Bo’?)
b. A: Who does Bo admire? Bo?
Reading 1 (short answer): Does Bo admire Bo?
Reading 2 (self correction): Did I say ‘Bo’?
CRs can take many forms, as illustrated in (13):
(13)
a. A: Did Bo leave?
b. Wot: B: Eh? / What? / Pardon?
c. Explicit (exp) : B: What did you say? / Did you say ‘Bo’ /What
do you mean ‘leave’?
d. Literal reprise : B: Did BO leave? / Did Bo LEAVE?
e. Wh-substituted Reprise : B: Did WHO leave? / Did BoWHAT?
f. Reprise sluice : B: Who? / What? / Where?
g. Reprise Fragments : B: Bo? / Leave?
h. Gap: B: Did Bo . . . ?
i. Filler : A: Did Bo . . . B: Win? (Table I from Purver (2006))
Now, as (14a) indicates, a priori ANY sub-utterance is clariﬁable,
including function words like ‘the’, as in (14c). While the potential
for repetition-oriented CRiﬁcation clearly applies to all utterances and
their parts, it is an open question whether this is true for semanti-
cally/pragmatically oriented CRiﬁcation. For empirical studies on this
see (Healey et al. (2003); Purver et al. (2003, 2006)).
(14)
a. Who rearranged the plug behind the table?
b. Who? / rearranged?/ the plug? / behind? / the table?
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c. A: Is that the shark? B: The? B: Well OK, A. (based on an
example in the ﬁlm Jaws.)
Moreover, a priori CRs can concern any aspect of the communicative
process. Nonetheless, a key ﬁnding of recent corpus studies of CRs in
both a general corpus (Purver et al. (2001)), as well as task oriented ones
(Rodriguez and Schlangen (2004); Rieser and Moore (2005)), indicate
that there are four main categories of CRs:
• Repetition: CRs that request the previous utterance to be repeated:
(15) a. Tim (1): Could I have one of those (unclear)?
Dorothy (2): Can you have what? (BNC, KW1)
b. s bust: Great memorial I think really isn’t it?
e bust: Beg pardon?
s bust: Be a good appropriate memorial if we can aﬀord it. (BNC,
KM8)
• Confirmation: CRs that seek to conﬁrm understanding of a prior
utterance:
(16) a. Marsha: yeah that’s it, this, she’s got three rottweilers now
and
Sarah: three? (=Are you saying she’s got THREE rottweilers
now?)
Marsha: yeah, one died so only got three now (BNC, KP2)
b. A: Is Georges here?
B: You’re asking if Georges Sand is here.
• Intended Content: CRs that query the intended content of a prior
utterance:
(17) a. Tim (5): Those pink things that af after we had our lunch.
Dorothy (6): Pink things?
Tim (7): Yeah. Er those things in that bottle.
Dorothy (8): Oh I know what you mean. For your throat?
(BNC, KW1)
b. A: Have a laugh and joke with Dick.
B: Dick?
A: Have a laugh and joke with Dick.
B: Who’s Dick? (BNC, KB7)
• Intention recognition: CRs that query the goal underlying a prior
utterance:
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(18) a. X: You know what, the conference might be downtown Seat-
tle. So I may have to call you back on that.
PT: OK. Did you want me to wait for the hotel then? (Commu-
nicator corpus, National and Technology (2000))
b. Norrine: When is the barbecue, the twentieth? (pause) Some-
thing of June.
Chris: Thirtieth.
Norrine: A Sunday.
Chris: Sunday.
Norrine: Mm.
Chris: Why? (= Why do you ask when the barbecue is)
Norrine: Becau Because I forgot (pause) That was the day I
was thinking of having a proper lunch party but I won’t do it if
you’re going out. (BNC, KBK)
As ever, these data impose a requirement on a theory of dialogue
to characterize the relevance of such utterances and to be able to de-
scribe precisely how the content of utterances such as the CRs in (15–18)
emerge. An additional twist, exempliﬁed in (19), is that the context re-
quired for this task has to be linguistically rich:
1. Hyperintensionality: ‘lawyer’ and ‘attorney’ are synonymous terms
but give rise to distinct CRiﬁcation conditions:
(19) a. Ariadne: Jo is a lawyer. Bora: A lawyer?/What do you mean
a lawyer?/#What do you mean an advocate?/#What do you
mean an attorney?
b. Ariadne: Jo is an advocate. Bora: #What do youmean a lawyer?/An
advocate?/What do you mean an advocate?/#What do you
mean an attorney?
2. Parallelism: the existence of syntactic and phonological parallelism
conditions on certain interpretations of clariﬁcation requests (CRs)
(9c) above and for detailed discussion see (Ginzburg and Cooper
(2004); Ginzburg (2012)).
3. Utterance tokens: It must underwrite reference to utterance tokens,
given that they are constituents of the content of CRs, though in
fact this is a more general requirement concerning quotative acts in
dialogue:
(20) a. A: Max is leaving. B: leaving? (=What does ‘leaving’ mean
in the A’s sub-utterance, NOT in general.)
b. A: Did Bo leave? B: Who is Bo?
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c. A: We’re fed up. B: Who is we? (=Who is we in the sub-
utterance needing clarification)
We brieﬂy discuss a tie-in of these considerations with work on quo-
tation in section 45.
1.3.4 Genre sensitivity
The extent to which one can make linguistic generalizations in a way
that evades genre–relativity is perhaps an open question; it is of course
also very much a question for those concerned with demarcating the
semantics/pragmatics boundary. Nonetheless, for anyone engaged in de-
signing systems that can interact with humans the importance of domain
speciﬁcity is taken for granted.
Genre speciﬁcity is one of the principal factors in determining, to use
Herb Clark’s phrase, what drives the dialogue—the basic intentions un-
derlying participation in a particular conversation. That is, the range of
topics that can be relevantly introduced for discussion: e.g. discussing the
price of bread is reasonable in a bakery, but not—putting aside special-
ized circumstances—in a courtroom. In certain cases a genre determines
the existence of special moves e.g. the opening and closing moves in an
English court (‘The court is in session.’, ‘The court will rise.’) or even
their form (e.g. the fact that in addressing a judge, one needs to end the
utterance with the vocative ‘m’lud’.).
Let us distinguish this notion of genre speciﬁcity (interaction deter-
mining genre specificity) from language determining genre specificity,
where a genre determines its own language—viz its own lexicon and
constructions. The existence of this kind of lexical genre speciﬁcity is
familiar to us via the notion of ‘jargon’, the latter less so, but its real-
ity should be clear—diﬀerent genres have distinct language models and
constructions appropriate for some domains are less so for others; for
discussion of how to combine this with formal grammar, see (Cooper
and Ranta (2008)). I will restrict attention here to interaction determin-
ing genre specificity, though any serious theory of dialogue will require
integration with the other notion as well.
In addition to Conversational Relevance, genre speciﬁcity is also clearly
implicated in Conversational Meaning, as we noted already in (2). NSUs
can appear as initiating moves (i.e. without a prior linguistic antecedent
or segment initially.). These seem to require a rather sterotypical inter-
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actional setting (buying tickets at a train station, querying for directions
in a taxi etc).
(21) a. Buying a train ticket:
Client: A return to Newcastle please. (=I want a return . . . ,
please give me a return . . . , . . . )
b. Driver to passenger in a taxi: Where to?
Explicating how such NSUs get resolved is a basic requirement for a
theory of dialogue.
1.3.5 Core Dialogue Phenomena as theoretical
benchmarks
In this section I have compiled a collection of dialogue phenomena which
can be used as benchmarks for theories of conversational relevance and
meaning.
Taken as a whole they make clear the need for a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
view of context and its evolution from the inﬂuential Stalnakerian view,
essentially that the eﬀects of utterances on the state of the conversa-
tion can be derived entirely from truth-conditional meaning (suitably
enriched dynamically) in interaction with general pragmatic principles.
For a start there is the fact that in dialogue one cannot appeal in gen-
eral to a single context, given context branching phenomena discussed
with respect to clariﬁcation interaction; there is the evidence that ‘di-
rect relevance’ is parametrized by agent–speciﬁc intentional factors, as
illustrated by rebound questions; there is the need to maintain non–
content oriented information in context due to parallelism constraints
on non-sentential utterances and the hyperintensionality of clariﬁcation
potential.
1.4 Dialogue Frameworks
In the ﬁrst part of the paper, I suggested two problems a theory of dia-
logue should strive to solve, Conversational Relevance and Conversational
Meaning. In this section I will indicate how some existing frameworks
tackle these problems and, in particular, the empirical challenges dis-
cussed in the previous section ; for a thoughtful comparison of recent
dialogue frameworks, see (Poesio and Rieser (2010)). Perhaps the cen-
tral development enabling progress is the emergence of a formally well
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deﬁned notion of the structure of a conversational state and, correspond-
ingly, notions of how such states change.
1.4.1 KOS
Dialogue Gameboards
I start by considering the framework KoS (Ginzburg (1994); Ginzburg
and Cooper (2004); Larsson (2002); Purver (2006); Ferna´ndez (2006);
Ginzburg and Ferna´ndez (2010); Ginzburg (2012)). KoS—a toponym,
not an acronym—is a theory that combines an approach to semantics
inspired by situation semantics and dynamic semantics with a view of
interaction inﬂuenced by CA. On the approach developed in KoS, there
is actually no single context — instead of a single context, analysis is
formulated at a level of information states, one per conversational par-
ticipant. Each information state consists of two ‘parts’, a private part
and the dialogue gameboard that represents information that arises from
publicized interactions. For recent psycholinguistic evidence supporting
this partition see (Brown-Schmidt et al. (2008)), an issue we return to
in section 1.5.3.
The type deﬁnition—in a formal sense we will shortly elucidate— of an
information state is given in (22a). We defer until somewhat later (brief)
discussion of the structure of the private part, which typically constitutes
a ‘hidden variable’ of dialogue analysis. For now we focus on the dialogue
gameboard. Its structure is given in (22b) — the spkr,addr ﬁelds allow
one to track turn ownership, Facts represents conversationally shared
assumptions, Moves represents the contents of moves that have been
grounded, QUD tracks the questions currently under discussion:
(22) a. TotalInformationState (TIS) =def
[
dialoguegameboard : DGBtype
private : Private
]
b. DGBType (provisional deﬁnition) =def

spkr : Ind
addr : Ind
utt-time : Time
c-utt : addressing(spkr,addr,utt-time)
Facts : Set(Proposition)
Moves : list(illocutionaryProposition)
QUD : poset(Question)


To understand better the speciﬁcation in (22), we need to make a
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brief digression concerning the logical underpinnings of KoS. KoS is for-
mulated within the framework of Type Theory with Records (Cooper
(2005, 2012); Cooper and Ginzburg (2013)), a model–theoretic descen-
dant of Martin-Lo¨f Type Theory (Ranta (1994)) and situation semantics
(Barwise and Perry (1983); Cooper and Poesio (1994); Seligman and
Moss (1997); Ginzburg and Sag (2000)). TTR enables one to develop a
semantic ontology, including entities such as events, propositions, and
questions, whence types characterizing questions and propositions, in
(22). With the same means TTR enables the construction of a gram-
matical ontology consisting of utterance types and tokens and of an in-
teractional domain in which agents utilize utterances to talk about the
semantic universe. What makes TTR advantageous for our dialogical
aims is that it provides access to both types and tokens at the object
level. This plays a key role in developing metacommunicative interac-
tion, as we shall see below, in that it enables simultaneous reference to
both utterances and utterance types. I propose that this constitutes a
fundamental requirement on logical frameworks that aim to characterize
dialogue.
For current purposes, the key notions of TTR are the notion of a
judgement and the notion of a record.
• The typing judgement: a : T classifying an object a as being of type
T .
• Records: A record is a set of ﬁelds assigning entities to labels of
the form (23a), partially ordered by a notion of dependence between
the ﬁelds—dependent ﬁelds must follow ﬁelds on which their values
depend. A concrete instance is exempliﬁed in (23b). Records are used
here to model events and states, including utterances, and dialogue
gameboards.b
(23)
a.


l1 = val1
l2 = val2
. . .
ln = valn


b Cooper and Ginzburg (2013) suggest that for events with even a modicum of
internal structure, one can enrich the type theory using the string theory
developed by Tim Fernando (e.g. Fernando (2007)).
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b.


x = -28
e-time = 2AM, Feb 17, 2011
e-loc = Nome
ctemp−at−in = o1


• Record Types: a record type is simply a record where each ﬁeld
represents a judgement rather than an assignment, as in (24a).
(24)


l1 : T1
l2 : T2
. . .
ln : Tn


The basic relationship between records and record types is that a
record r is of type RT if each value in r assigned to a given label li
satisﬁes the typing constraints imposed by RT on li. More precisely,
(25) The record

l1 = a1
l2 = a2
. . .
ln = an

 is of type:


l1 : T1
l2 : T2
. . .
ln : Tn


iﬀ a1 : T1, a2 : T2, . . . , an : Tn
To exemplify this, (26b) is a possible type for (23b), assuming the
conditions in (26c) hold. Records types are used to model utterance
types (aka as signs) and to express rules of conversational interaction.
(26) a.


x : Ind
e-time : Time
e-loc : Loc
ctemp−at−in : temp at in(e-time,e-location,x)


b. -28 : Ind; 3:45AM, Feb 17, 2011 : Time; Nome : Loc; o1 :
temp at in(3:45AM, Feb 17, 2011, Nome, -28)
The ﬁnal logical notion we introduce is the situation semantics notion
of an Austinian proposition Barwise and Etchemendy (1987). These are
records of the form (27a). The type of Austinian propositions is the
record type (27b),where the type RecType† is a basic type which de-
notes the type of (non-dependent) record types closed under meet, join
and negation. Truth conditions for Austinian propositions are deﬁned in
(27c):
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(27) a.
[
sit = s
sit-type = T
]
b. AustProp =def
[
sit : Rec
sit-type : RecType†
]
c. A proposition p =
[
sit = s0
sit-type = ST0
]
is true iﬀ s0 : ST0
One important subtype of AustProp is the type of illocutionary propo-
sitions (IllocProp). These are the content of conversational moves. An
example of such a proposition is in (28a), where in addition to the two
standard ﬁelds for a proposition, ﬁelds exist for speaker, addressee, and
utterance time and descriptive content. (28b) is the general character-
ization of the type IllocProp. For notational economy I will typically
abbreviate (28a) as (28c), omitting the ﬁelds, retaining only the illocu-
tionary predicate type component:
(28)
a.


sit = u1
spkr = x
addr = y
utt-time = t
a = p
R = Assert
sit-type =
[
c1 : R(x,y,t,p)
]


b. IllocProp =def


sit : Record
spkr : Ind
addr : Ind
utt-time : Time
a : AbstSemObj
R : IllocRel
sit-type =
[
c1 : R(spkr,addr,utt-time,a)
]
: RecType


c. R(spkr,addr,utt-time,p)
Armed with these basic logical notions, let us return to characterizing
conversational states. A conversational state c1 will be a record r1 such
that (29a) holds; in other words r1 shd have the make up in (29b) and
the constraints in (29b) need to be met:
(29) a. r1 : DGBType
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b.


spkr = A
addr =B
utt-time = t1
c-utt = putt(A,B,t1)
Facts =cg1
Moves = 〈m1,. . . ,mk〉
QUD= Q


c. A: Ind, B: IND, t1: TIME, putt(A,B,t1) : addressing(A,B,t1),
cg1: Set(Proposition), 〈m1,. . . ,mk〉 : list(illocutionaryProposition),
Q : poset(Question)
Our job as dialogue analysts is to construct a theory that will explain
how conversational interactions lead to observed conversational states.
Let us consider how an initial conversational state looks like: initially no
moves have been made and no issues introduced, so a dialogue game-
board will have the form in (30):
(30)


spkr = A
addr = B
utt-time = t1
Moves =
〈〉
qud =
{}
facts = cg1


This allows us to write a lexical entry for a greeting word such as
‘hi’, as in (31), whose context—speciﬁed via the ﬁeld ‘dgb-params’—is
supposed to be the initial state of a conversation. For a justiﬁcation of
this analysis of ‘hi’ and, more generally, the integration of illocutionary
information in the grammar, see Ginzburg et al. (2003); Ginzburg (2012).
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(31)


phon : hi
cat.head = interj : syncat
dgb-params :


spkr : IND
addr : IND
utt-time : TIME
Moves =
〈〉
: list(LocProp)
qud =
{}
: set(Question)


cont = Greet(spkr,ind,utt-time) : IllocProp


How do we specify the eﬀect of a conversational move? The basic
units of change are mappings between dialogue gameboards that spec-
ify how one gameboard conﬁguration can be modiﬁed into another on
the basis of dialogue moves. We call a mapping between DGB types a
conversational rule. The types specifying its domain and its range we
dub, respectively, the pre(conditions) and the effects, both of which are
subtypes of DGBType. A conversational rule that enables us to explain
the eﬀect a greeting, the initial conversational move, has on the DGB is
given in (32). The preconditions state that both Moves and QUD need
to be empty; the sole eﬀect is to initialize Moves with the illocutionary
proposition greet(A,B), A the speaker, B the addressee.
(32) Greet

pre :


spkr : Ind
addr : Ind
utt-time : TIME
moves =
〈〉
: list(IllocProp)
qud =
{}
: poset(Question)
facts : Prop


eﬀects :


spkr = pre.spkr : Ind
addr = pre.addr : Ind
utt-time = pre.utt-time : TIME
Moves =
〈
Greet(spkr,addr,utt-time)
〉
: list(IllocProp)
qud = pre.qud : poset(Question)
facts = pre.facts : Prop




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In the sequel I employ a number of abbreviatory conventions. First,
instead of specifying the full value of the list Moves, we usually record
merely its ﬁrst member, which we call ‘LatestMove’. Second the precon-
ditions can be written as a merge of two record types DGBType−∧merge
PreCondSpec, one of which DGBType− is a strict supertype of DG-
BType and therefore represents predictable information common to all
conversational rules; PreCondSpec represents information speciﬁc to
the preconditions of this particular interaction type. Similarly,the ef-
fects can be written as a merge of two record types DGBType0 ∧merge
ChangePrecondSpec, where DGBType0 is a supertype of the precondi-
tions and ChangePrecondSpec represents those aspects of the precon-
ditions that have changed. So we can abbreviate conversational rules as
in (33a). For example, the abbreviated version of (32) Greet would be as
in (33b).
(33) a.
[
pre : PreCondSpec
eﬀects : ChangePrecondSpec
]
b.


pre :

moves =
〈〉
: list(IllocProp)
qud =
{}
: poset(Question)


eﬀects :
[
LatestMove = Greet(spkr,addr,utt-time) : IllocProp
]


One ﬁnal remark on this score relating to the speciﬁcation of turn own-
ership via the labels ‘spkr’, ‘addr’. In 2-person interaction there are three
basic possibilities: the turn remains the same (32a), the turn necessarily
changes (exempliﬁed in (35) and occurring in cases such as assertion
acceptance, where one cannot accept one’s own assertion), or the turn
is underspeciﬁed, as speciﬁed in (34a)—which picks the speaker from
among the conversationalists and the addressee as the distinct other el-
ement in this set. —it is up for grabs for either conversationalist, as in
(34c), No turn change gets abbreviated away in the notational conven-
tion introduced in (33). The other two cases will get notated explicitly—
turn change by specifying the eﬀects, whereas turn underspeciﬁcation
by means of a merge type conjunction, as in (34b), exempliﬁed below in
(37b) and many other cases:
(34)
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a. Turnholder-Underspeciﬁed =def

pre :
[
spkr : Ind
addr : Ind
]
eﬀects :


PrevAud =
{
pre.spkr,pre.addr
}
: Set(Ind)
spkr : Ind
c1 : member(spkr, PrevAud)
addr : Ind
c2 : member(addr, PrevAud)
∧ addr 6= spkr




b. eﬀects : TurnUnderspec ∧merge
[
. . .
]
As a ﬁrst illustration, we provide a lexical entry for a word like ‘marx-
abteyn’ discussed in section 1.3.2: this entry assumes that the word pre-
supposes that the its contextual background requires the LatestMove to
be a greeting and it expresses a countergreeting; strengthening the pre-
supposition to require the form of the antecedent greeting to be ‘marx-
aba’ is possible within the reﬁnement to KoS sketched in section 45.
(35)


phon : marxabteyn
cat.head = interj : syncat
dgb-params :


spkr : IND
addr : IND
utt-time : TIME
utt-time’ : TIME
Moves =
〈
Greet(addr,spkr,utt-time)
〉
: list(IllocProp)
qud =
{}
: poset(Question)


cont = CounterGreet(spkr,ind,utt-time’) : IllocProp


Parting, and concomitantly the termination of a conversation can be
speciﬁed in quite similar terms, though as Ginzburg (2012) shows, they
involve quite subtle presuppositions that seem absent from greeting in-
teraction.
Querying and Assertion in Dialogue
Before considering how the actual dialogical interaction gets regulated,
it is worth saying something about the “direct”, coherent responses to
1.4 Dialogue Frameworks 25
a question q. As we discussed above, there seem to be two types of
such responses—propositional answers and queries. With respect to the
latter, I assume that dependence is the central coherence relation; see
( Lupkowski and Ginzburg (2014)) for account that shows how to cap-
ture the coherence of other types of question responses. Given that, I
introduce the notion of a q–speciﬁc utterance:
(36) Given a question q, an utterance u is q–speciﬁc iﬀ either:
1. u.cont = p : Prop and About(p,q)
2. u.cont = q1 : Question and Depend(q,q1)
(37a) says that given a question q and ASK(A,B,q) being the Lat-
estMove, one can update QUD with q as QUD–maximal. QSPEC can
be thought of as KoS’ ‘relevance maxim’: it characterizes the contex-
tual background of reactive queries and assertions. (37b) says that if q is
QUD–maximal, then subsequent to this either conversational participant
may make a move constrained to be q–speciﬁc (37c):
(37) a. Ask QUD–incrementation

pre :
[
q : Question
LatestMove = Ask(spkr,addr,utt-time,q): IllocProp
]
eﬀects :
[
qud =
〈
q,pre.qud
〉
: poset(Question)
]


b. QSPEC

pre :
[
qud =
〈
q, Q
〉
: poset(Question)
]
eﬀects : TurnUnderspec ∧merge

r : Prop ∨ Question
R: IllocRel
LatestMove = R(spkr,addr,utt-time,r) : IllocProp
c1 : Qspeciﬁc(r,q)




QSPEC involves factoring out turn taking from the assumption that
A asking q means B answering it. In other words, the fact that A has
asked q leaves underspeciﬁed who is to address q (ﬁrst or at all). This
is justiﬁed by data such as that in (38a,b), where the querier can or
indeed needs to keep the turn, as well as multi-party cases such as (38c)
where the turn is multiply distributed. It is also crucial for describing
parent/infant interaction, where invariably the parent answers their own
questions (Ginzburg and Moradlou (2013)):
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(38)
a. Vicki: When is, when is Easter? March, April? (BNC, KC2)
b. Brian: you could encourage, what’s his name? Neil. (BNC, KSR)
c. A:Who should we invite? B: Perhaps Noam. C: Martinu. D: Bedrich.
Considering assertion from a dialogical perspective means above all
taking seriously the fact that in 2 person interaction A’s asserting p
requires B to react, either by producing an explicit acceptance utterance
or gesture Clark (1996); Nakano et al. (2003) or by discussing whether
p is indeed the case.
(39) illustrates some interesting patterns involving post-assertoric con-
texts: (39a,b) indicate that ‘yes’ can occur both in such a context and in
one following polar query. (39c,d) illustrates that acceptance utterances
need to be supplied by the addressee of the assertion, however such ut-
terances are not acceptable if the asserter asks for explicit commitment,
as in (39e). (39f) shows that the conﬁrmation particle ‘Right?’ is only
available to the original asserter, whereas the dubitative particle ‘Re-
ally?’ is only available to the addressee, while a same polarity tag, as in
(39g,h) is available to both speakers:c
(39) a. A: Bo is leaving. B: Yes.
b. A: Is Bo leaving? B: Yes.
c. A: Bo is leaving. B: I see.
d. A: Bo is leaving, ♯I see.
e. A: Bo is leaving, right?. B: Right/Yes /♯I see.
f. A: Bo is leaving. B: Really?/♯Right?
g. A: Bo is leaving, ♯really?
h. A: Bo is leaving, is he?
i. A: Bo is leaving. B: Is he?
A full treatment of this pattern would take us too far aﬁeld and is a
matter of vigorous current debate (see Beyssade and Marandin (2009);
Farkas and Bruce (2010); Malamud and Stephenson (2011); Ginzburg
(2012))—one issue being in what cases to assume that the move (‘pure
assertion’, ‘conﬁrmation’ etc) involves introducing p? into QUD, using
a rule analogous to (37a). However this debate gets resolved, one thing
this data emphasizes is how grammar needs to make reference to
the fine structure of conversational context to explicate subtle
diﬀerences such as those between ‘Right?’ and ‘Really?. Possible lexical
entries for these particles are sketched in (40):
c Thanks to Elisabet Engdahl for pointing out to me the contrast (39f,g).
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(40) a.


phon : right
cat.head = interj : syncat
dgb-params :


spkr : IND
addr : IND
utt-time : TIME
utt-time’ : TIME
LatestMove.content = Assert(spkr,addr,utt-time,p) : IllocProp


cont = Check(spkr,addr,utt-time’,p?) : IllocProp


b.


phon : really
cat.head = interj : syncat
dgb-params :


spkr : IND
addr : IND
utt-time : TIME
utt-time’ : TIME
LatestMove.content = Assert(addr,spkr,utt-time,p) : IllocProp


cont = Doubt(spkr,addr,utt-time’,p?) : IllocProp


FACTS and QUD are coupled: a question q can be introduced only in
so far FACTS does not contain information resolving q. Hence, updating
FACTS involves a simultaneous downdate of QUD. This is formulated
in (41): given an acceptance or conﬁrmation of p by B, p can be unioned
into FACTS, whereas QUD is modiﬁed by the function NonResolve.
NonResolve is a function that maps a partially ordered set of questions
poset(q) and a set of propositions P to a partially ordered set of ques-
tions poset′(q) which is identical to poset(q) modulo those questions in
poset(q) resolved by members of P .
(41) Fact Update/ QUD Downdate =def

pre :


p : Prop
LatestMove = Accept(spkr,addr,utt-time,p) ∨
Conﬁrm(spkr,addr,utt-time,p) : IllocProp
qud =
〈
p?,pre.qud
〉
: poset(Question)


eﬀects :

facts = pre.facts ∪
{
p
}
: Set(Prop)
qud = NonResolve(pre.qud,facts) : poset(Question)




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The notion of q–speciﬁcity and the conversational rules sketched above
provide us with an initial characterization of query relevance and how it
emerges in interaction. The approach to relevance and contextual struc-
ture and change discussed up to this point resembles closely the approach
developed in work by Roberts (Roberts (1996, 2011a,b)). Roberts’ frame-
work diﬀers from KoS with respect to certain assumptions and in terms
of its basic methodological aims. Roberts abstracts away from meta-
communicative interaction, hence she assumes only the existence of a
single, communal context which tracks ﬁelds corresponding to FACTS,
MOVES, and QUD. One of her principal aims is to oﬀer a precise ﬂesh-
ing out of the Gricean program using this view of context, identifying
for instance as the primary intention at any time to be the intention
to address the agreed-upon (maximal element) of QUD. She uses this
framework to develop detailed accounts of intonational focus, deﬁnite-
ness, and presupposition/implicature.
We need to consider how to incorporate genre speciﬁcity and meta-
communicative interaction into our account of relevance.
Incorporating genre specificity
Psycholinguistic labs aside, all meaningful interaction occurs within a
particular conversational genre / activity type / language game. As I em-
phasized above, this is the fundamental entity determining what drives
a dialogue—what issues can and need to be discussed and also how such
discussion will take place (in terms of constructions and lexica), though
this latter aspect I cannot consider here.
A very basic issue is—how to classify a conversation into a genre? The
approach I describe here originates with Larsson (2002), building on ear-
lier work in AI, and subsequently somewhat recast in Ginzburg (2012).
The essential idea is to provide a description of an information state of
a conversational participant who has successfully completed such a con-
versation. This is a reasonable way of doing things as long as the ﬁnal
state does not lose “signiﬁcant” information concerning what took place
during the conversation. On the view of contextual evolution described
here the ﬁnal state of a conversational participant will be a DGB of the
type in (42):
(42)
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
facts : Set(Prop)
qud =
{}
: poset(Question)
moves : list(IllocProp)


At the end of a conversation QUD is empty,d but the issues that have
been discussed during the conversation can be recovered by examining
FACTS: we can introduce a simple reﬁnement of FACTS update/QUD
downdate such that every acceptance leads to the recording not solely
of the facts added but also which questions were resolved by these facts
and downdated. We can track such question using a ﬁeld labelled QNUD
(Questions No longer Under Discussion).e. Final states of a conversation
will then be records of type T for T a subtype of DGBTypefin. I rename
this latter to GenreType since it may be identiﬁed as the general type
of all conversational genres:
(43) GenreType =def

facts : Set(Prop)
qnud : set(question)
moves : list(IllocProp)


Let us consider two toy examples. Casual conversation among acquain-
tances seems to be governed by a convention that an initial greeting
optionally raises as MaxQUD an issue glossable as λP.P (A) (‘How is
A’), λP.P (B) (‘How is B’), A and B being the conversational partici-
pants. QSpec then licenses assertions such as ‘You look well/as young
as ever/pale etc’. In contrast, interaction in a bakery is more speciﬁcally
delimited: the client needs to indicate what baked goods are desired,
whereas the vendor needs to indicate how much needs to be paid. Spec-
iﬁcations for both types are in (44):
(44)
a. CasualChat =def
d Or rather, in order to end a conversation CPs need to ensure QUD is empty.
e Such information is also what underwrites presuppositions of resolvedness. Such
presuppositions characterize the complements of fact embedding verbs that
combine with interrogative clauses, as discussed in Ginzburg (1995b).
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
A : Ind
B : Ind
utt-time : TimeInterval
c1 : Speak(A,t) ∨ Speak(B,t)
facts : Set(Prop)
qnud : list(question)
c2 :
{
λP.P (A), λP.P (B)
}
⊂ qnud
moves : list(IllocProp)


b. BakeryBuy =def

A : Ind
B : Ind
utt-time : TimeInterval
c1 : Speak(A,t) ∨ Speak(B,t)
facts : Set(Prop)
qnud : list(question)
c2 :
{
λx.InShopBuy(A,x),
λx.Pay(A,x)
}
⊂ qnud
moves : list(IllocProp)


Diﬀering eﬀects—e.g. whether questions needs to be discussed in a
certain order— can also be described depending on whether we assume
QNUD to be an unordered set, partially ordered, or a list. The appeal
to genres is most crucial in explicating topic choice in initiating moves,
where without some such notion one could in principle address any issue
whatever. For reasons of space, I will not enter into the issue of initiating
move speciﬁcation and merely hint at how this can be done. A genre type
provide a speciﬁcation of how a conversation can unfold. Assuming that
information states that encode this information, one can then express
in precise terms the constraints a genre sets on moves in the following
terms:
(45) m0 is felicitous relative to the current DGB dgb0, and G0, the
genre one assumes the conversation to be, if and only if one believes
that updating dgb0 with m0 results in an ﬁnal state dgb1 which is
a conversation of type G0.
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Metacommunicative Interaction
Integrating metacommunicative interaction into the DGB involves two
modiﬁcations to the picture we have had so far, one minor and one major.
The minor modiﬁcation, drawing on an early insight of CA, is that repair
can involve ‘putting aside’ an utterance for a while, a while during which
the utterance is repaired. That in itself can be eﬀected without further
ado by adding further structure to the DGB, speciﬁcally an additional
ﬁeld we will call Pending.
‘Putting the utterance aside’ raises the issue of what is it that we are
‘putting aside’. In other words, how do we represent the utterance? Most
work on (dialogue) context to date involves reasoning and representation
solely on a semantic/logical level. But if we wish to explicate MCI, we
already saw at the end of section 1.3.3 data from hyperintensionality,
parallelism, and utterance tokens reasons indicating that we cannot limit
ourselves in this way.
These considerations lead Ginzburg (2012) to conclude that the type
of Pending must combine tokens of the utterance, its parts, and of
the constituents of the content with the utterance type associated with
the utterance. An entity that ﬁts this speciﬁcation is the locutionary
proposition deﬁned by the utterance: in the immediate aftermath of
a speech event u, Pending gets updated with a record of the form[
sit = u
sit-type = Tu
]
(of type locutionary proposition (LocProp)). Here Tu is
a grammatical type for classifying u that emerges during the process
of parsing u. In other words, an entity such as the sign in the sense of
sign-based grammars such as Head Driven Phrase Structure Grammar
(HPSG), Categorial Grammar (see e.g. Calder et al. (1988); Moortgat
(1997)), or in versions of Lexical Functional Grammar (see e.g. Muskens
(2001)). The relationship between u and Tu—describable in terms of
the proposition pu =
[
sit = u
sit-type = Tu
]
— can be utilized in providing an
analysis of grounding/CRiﬁcation conditions:
(46)
a. Grounding: pu is true: the utterance type fully classiﬁes the utter-
ance token.
b. CRiﬁcation: pu is false, either because Tu is weak (e.g. incom-
plete word recognition) or because u is incompletely speciﬁed (e.g.
incomplete contextual resolution—problems with reference resolu-
tion or sense disambiguation).
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This means that—incorporating also the assumption regarding non-
resolvedness of questions in QUD, mentioned above—the DGB now has
the type deﬁnition in (47); there is an interesting theoretical and em-
pirical issue as to what type to associate with the elements of Moves:
the LatestMove also needs to be a locutionary proposition, not merely
a content, at least within a system such as that developed in (Ginzburg
(2012)): speakers are assumed to update the DGB with the content of
their utterances as soon as the utterance is completed. However, given
the potential need to engage in clariﬁcatory discussion concerning the
utterance, backtracking to the locutionary proposition needs to be pos-
sible. Whether this applies to other moves remains to be addressed ex-
perimentally.
(47) DGBType (ﬁnal version) =def

spkr : Ind
addr : Ind
utt-time : Time
c-utt : addressing(spkr,addr,utt-time)
Pending : list(LocProp)
Moves : list(LocProp)
Facts : Set(Prop)
QUD : poset(Question)
non-resolve-cond : ∀q ∈ QUD[¬Resolve(FACTS, q)]


In principle one could have a theory of CRiﬁcation based on generating
all available CRs an utterance could give rise to. But in practice, as the
data in (14) showed us, there are simply too many to be associated in a
‘precompiled’ form with a given utterance type.
Instead, repetition and meaning–oriented CRs can be speciﬁed by
means of a uniform class of conversational rules, dubbed Clarification
Context Update Rules (CCURs) in (Ginzburg (2012)). Each CCUR spec-
iﬁes an accommodated MaxQUD built up from a sub-utterance u1 of
the target utterance, the maximal element of Pending (MaxPending).
Common to all CCURs is a license to follow up MaxPending with an
utterance which is co-propositional with MaxQud. (48) is a simpliﬁed
formulation of one CCUR, Parameter identification, which allows B to
raise the issue about A’s sub-utterance u0: what did A mean by u0?:
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(48) Parameter identification:

pre :


Spkr : Ind
MaxPending : LocProp
u0 ∈ MaxPending.sit.constits


eﬀects :


MaxQUD =
[
q = λxMean(A,u0,x)
fec = u0
]
: InfoStruc
LatestMove : LocProp
c1: CoProp(LatestMove.cont,MaxQUD.q)




Parameter Identiﬁcation (48) underpins CRs such as (49b–49c) as
follow-ups to (49a). We can also deal with corrections, as in (49d). B’s
corrective utterance is co-propositional with λxMean(A,u0,x), and hence
allowed by the speciﬁcation:
(49) a. A: Is Bo here?
b. B: Who do you mean ‘Bo’?
c. B: Bo? (= Who is ‘Bo’?)
d. B: You mean Jo.
As a ﬁnal point, I should add a remark concerning the considerable
philosophical literature on the various kinds of quotation (see e.g. Cap-
pelen and Lepore (2012) for a survey) and a growing linguistic literature
(see e.g. De Brabanter (2010) for a survey). On the whole, this work
has not had much tie in with dialogue, though works such as Clark
and Gerrig (1990); Recanati (2010) propose a view of (direct) quota-
tion as involving a demonstration to a previous speech or other sound
producing event. Ginzburg and Cooper (2014) argue that by utilizing ut-
terance types and locutionary propositions as denotations for quotative
constructions many of the seemingly mysterious aspects of quotation
disappear.
Combining Relevance
Sofar we have characterized dialogical relevance in a modular fashion—
indicating various sources of relevance—illocutionary, genre–speciﬁc, and
metacommunicative. This modularity, while helpful methodologically, is
clearly a theoretical artefact. One might ponder whether we actually, in
practice, need a means of combining the various strands into a single,
uniﬁed notion of relevance.
One argument for the need derive from cases where relevance is man-
ifestly absent. One such case was pointed out originally by Grice and
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relates to cases where an explicitly irrelevant response is provided in or-
der to communicate the lack of wish to address a previous utterance, as
in (50a,b). A related case are utterances which trigger CRs about their
relevance, exempliﬁed by (50c):
(50)
a. A: Horrible talk by Rozzo. B: It’s very hot in here.
b. Harry: Is that you James? Stella: What? No, it isn’t. Who is it?
Harry: Where’s James? Stella: He’s out. Harry: Out? Oh, well, all
right. I’ll be straight round. Stella: What are you talking about?
Who are you? ( Harold Pinter ‘The Collection’. In: Plays Two, p.
133)
c. Marjorie: Don’t touch that cos she hasn’t had it yet. Dorothy: Does
she eat anything? Marjorie: What do you mean? (British National
Corpus (BNC))
To the extent we wish to write rules that capture these inferences
and/or preconditions, we need to have an IrRelevance predicate, directly
relatable to a Relevance predicate.
What then does Relevance amount to? Pretheoretically, Relevance re-
lates an utterance u to an information state I just in case there is a
way to successfully update I with u. Let us restrict attention to the case
where the input context is a query. Given a set of conversational rules
C, a grammar G and an information state I0 : TIS, an utterance u is
U(tterance)C,G
I0 -relevant iﬀ there exist c1, . . . , ck+1 ∈ C, Tu ∈ G, k ≥
0 such that c1(I0) = I1, . . . , ck+1(Ik) = Ik+1, where C’s information
state I0 satisﬁes (51a); where by means of a sequence of updates the
locutionary proposition pu = prop(u, Tu) becomes the value of Latest-
Move (condition (51b); and the ﬁnal element of the sequence of updates
Ik+1 is such that one of the conditions in (51c-f) is satisﬁed—u is ei-
ther q–speciﬁc, an appropriate CR, relates to the issue of willingness to
discuss q, or is genre–relevant:
(51) a. I0.DGB.LatestMove = v; v.content = Ask(A,q),
b. Ik+1.DGB.LatestMove = pu
c. pu.content is q–speciﬁc relative to I.DGB, Or
d. pu.content is CoPropositional with some question q0 that satisﬁes q0 =
CCUR1.eﬀects.
maxqud(I0.DGB.MaxPending) for some Clariﬁcation Context Update
Rule CCUR1, Or
e. pu.content is q0–speciﬁc, where q0 is the question ?WishDiscuss(B,q),
Or
f. One of C’s beliefs in I0 is that: for some G0 there exists dgb1 such that
(I0.DGB
⊕
pu) ⊏ dgb1, and such that dgb1 : G0
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A number of remarks can be made about (51), primarily about the
relata of this notion.
• The deﬁnition is relative to both the set of conversational rules and
to a grammar from which the types Tu from which locutionary propo-
sitions originate.
• Relevance is, by and large, DGB oriented. Only (51f) explicitly in-
volves reference to the entire information state.
Non Sentential Utterances
The detailed theory of context/relevance developed in previous sections
enables the development of a grammar of the various types of sentential
fragments discussed earlier. The basic strategy adopted in KoS to ana-
lyze NSUs is to specify construction types where the combinatorial oper-
ations integrate the (surface) denotata of the fragments with elements of
the DGB. I sketch how this can be done with one such construction type,
a detailed account of a wide variety of sentential fragments analyzed in
such terms can be found in Ferna´ndez (2006); Ginzburg (2012).
B’s utterance in (52) can receive a variety of contents, depending on
the context in which it is uttered: it can be interpreted as a short an-
swer, as in (52b); it can be interpreted without any prior utterance, as
in (52c), though in such a case—as per Wittgenstein and Clark—the
paraphrase provided here is only one of several possible; it can also be
interpreted as the (‘metalinguistic’) correction in (52d). The diﬀerent
mechanisms underlying these resolutions can be uniformly described by
the schema in (52e). This indicates that the content of the construction
type Declarative-fragment-clause arises by predicating the propositional
function constituted by the maximal element of QUD of the content
of the bare fragment utterance, a generalization of a rule proposed al-
ready in Hausser and Zaeﬀerer (1979). The particular content exhibited
in (52b) could arise because the issue ‘What did you buy in the bakery’
is MaxQUD as a result of A’s query; (52c) arises given that the issue
‘What does the current customer want to buy’ is a characteristic issue of
the BakeryShopping genre (as it is of many related genres.); the content
in (52d) could arise if B decided not to ground A’s utterance, but using
the parameter identification conversational rule to initiate repair interac-
tion, accommodates the issue ‘What did you mean by utterance ‘four
crescents’?’ as MaxQUD.
(52) a. B: Four croissants.
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b. (Context: A: What did you buy in the bakery?) Content: I bought
four croissants in the bakery.
c. (Context: A: (smiles at B, who has become the next customer to be
served at the bakery.)) Content: I would like to buy four croissants.
d. (Context: A: Dad bought four crescents.) Content: You mean that
Dad bought four croissants.
e. Declarative-fragment-clause:
Cont = DGB.MaxQUD(u-frag.cont) : Prop
I have also emphasized that diﬀerent NSU constructions exhibit mor-
phosyntactic and/or phonological parallelism with their antecdents. In
other words, not only the combinatorial semantics of NSU construc-
tions integrates information from the DGB, but that this is also po-
tentially true of the morphosyntactic and phonological speciﬁcations of
such constructions. Given that parallelism, typically, exhibits a similar
time course to the salience of the relevant entity of QUD, we can cap-
ture such eﬀects by viewing QUD as tracking not simply questions qua
semantic objects, but pairs of entities: a question and an antecedent sub-
utterance. This latter entity provides a partial speciﬁcation of the focal
(sub)utterance, and hence it is dubbed the focus establishing constituent
(FEC) (cf. parallel element in higher order uniﬁcation–based approaches
to ellipsis resolution e.g. Gardent and Kohlhase (1997).) Thus, the FEC
in the QUD associated with a wh-query will be the wh-phrase utterance,
the FEC in the QUD emerging from a quantiﬁcational utterance will be
the QNP utterance, whereas the FEC in a QUD accommodated in a
clariﬁcation context will be the sub-utterance under clariﬁcation. Hence
the type of QUD is InfoStruc, as deﬁned in (53):
(53) Info-struc =
[
q : Question
fec : set(LocProp)
]
In light of this, we can write a speciﬁcation of decl-frag-cl as in (54).
Categorially the construction is sentential, it has one dgb parameter—
i.e. contextual parameter—the maximal element of QUD. Its content
arises by functional application of MaxQUD to the entity denoted by
the fragment and categorially the fragment has to match the categorial
speciﬁcation of the FEC:
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(54) declarative-fragment-clause

cat = v :syncat
dgb-params.max-qud :
[
q : UnaryWhQuestion
fec : LocProp
]
cont = max-qud.q(hd-dtr.cont.x) : Prop


hd-dtr:

cat = max-qud.fec.cat : Syncat
cont :
[
x : IND
]


1.4.2 Segmented Discourse Representation Theory
(SDRT)
SDRT, discussed in more detail in Asher’s article on theories of discourse
in this volume emerged from DRT by adding to DRT discourse relations
inspired by theories of text structure such as Rhetorical Structure The-
ory (Mann and Thompson (1987))—the relations involved include nar-
ration, explanation, elaboration, parallel. Although SDRT was originally
developed as a theory of coherence for texts (Asher (1993)), it was sub-
sequently scaled up to apply to dialogue (Asher and Lascarides (1998,
2003)). This involves positing coherence relations across turns, including
relations such as QuestionAnswerPair (QAP) and Query-Elaboration.
These are used in an account of Query-Response coherence, indirect re-
sponses, discourse connectives, and non-sentential utterances (Schlangen
(2003)).
In its initial formulations SDRT implicitly emphasized the continu-
ity between text and dialogue coherence. Such continuity can indeed be
recognized, to a ﬁrst approximation, in that a single speaker’s (uninter-
rupted) turn, for instance in an extended narrative, has many points in
common with a text:
(55) A: Max had a great evening last night. He had a great meal.
He ate salmon. He devoured lots of cheese. He then won a dancing
competition.
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Nonetheless, there is an intrinsic diﬀerence: the dialogical version must
allow for various potential moves along the way by other interlocuters,
possibilities that do not exist in a text.
(56)
A: Max had a great evening last night.
B: That’s not what I heard.
A: He did though. He had a great meal.
B: Meaning what?
A: He ate salmon. He devoured lots of cheese.
B: Perhaps.
A: He then won a dancing competition.
In recent versions of SDRT intended for dialogue (e.g. Lascarides and
Asher (2009)), the need to develop a distinct theory of relevance for di-
alogue has been emphasized, motivated in particular in work on propo-
sitional grounding—the assumptions dialogue participants all accept for
conversational purposes. Dialogue SDRSs (DSDRSs) are deﬁned by as-
sociating an SDRS for each participant at each turn, and accordingly
the semantics of a dialogue turn is the product of the dynamic seman-
tics for each constituent SDRS. As with its approach to text, SDRT
for dialogue divides in two the task of semantico-pragmatic analysis: a
glue-logic is developed to map syntactic structures to DSDRSs, whereas
a defeasible cognitive logic explicates reasoning about agents’ cognitive
states in virtue of what they say (represented in the DSDRSs). The cog-
nitive logic extends dynamic logics of public announcement (e.g. Baltag
et al. (1998)) to provide default links between public announcements
and cognitive attitudes. It also provides for links between game-theoretic
principles and general axioms of rationality and cooperativity.
Similarly, whereas SDRT’s analyses of dialogue have until recently
been developed assuming cooperativity was maintained, a recent devel-
opment (e.g. Asher and Lascarides (2012)) has been the abandonment
of this assumption to deal with settings where this does not obtain.
1.4.3 PTT
PTT (Poesio and Traum (1997); Poesio and Rieser (2010, 2011)) shares
certain commonalities with both KoS and with SDRT. Like KoS, it is
an information–state based dialogue theory; it also draws inspiration
from the Situation Semantics view of utterances. Indeed PTT pioneered
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an emphasis on incrementality in dialogue, via the notion of micro-
conversational events (MCEs), a notion inspired by Barwise and Perry’s
realist view of grammar (Barwise and Perry (1983), p. 122, recent dis-
cussion in Ginzburg (2011).). PTT shares with SDRT a DRT-inspired
theoretical underpinning.
To date, work in PTT has focussed on providing highly detailed ac-
counts of grounding, taking as its starting point Traum’s computational
model (Traum (1994)), of a variety of dialogue acts (Poesio and Traum
(1997)), of collaborative utterances (Poesio and Rieser (2010)), of anaphora
in dialogue, involving also visual antecedents (Poesio and Rieser (2011),
gesture (Rieser and Poesio (2009)) and pointing (Rieser (2004)).
An information state is assumed to consist of three main parts:
• A private part, with information available to the participant, but not
introduced in the dialogue.
• A public part consisting of the moves that are assumed by that agent
to have become part of the common ground.
• A semi-public part, consisting of the information introduced with con-
tributions that have not yet been acknowledged. This information is
not yet grounded, but it is accessible.
Recent work in PTT has built on work in the philosophy of action
(Bratman (1992); Tuomela (2000)) to oﬀer a reﬁned view of how inten-
tion recognition can drive interaction. Hence, the fact that one or more
agents have a certain (possibly collective) intention, and that they are
under certain obligations, may become part of the private, semi-private
and public parts of an information state.
From a semantic point of view, PTT takes DRT as its starting point,
speciﬁcally the compositional version from (Muskens (1996). However,
the DRSs it uses to represent a discourse situation include not solely the
standard DRS constituents (discourse referents for individuals, states
and events), but also discourse referents for conversational events and as-
sociated conditions characterizing such events. This enables such events
to be constituents of other conditions, e.g. acknowledgements, turn–
control.
From its inception PTT has emphasized incremental interpretation,
inspired by a wealth of psycholinguistic evidence (for extensive discus-
sion and references see Rieser and Schlangen (2011).). The assumption
being that the information state of a conversational participant is up-
dated at frequent intervals—minimally, word-by-word. The term micro-
conversational event(MCE) is used to refer to an event of uttering a sub-
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sentential constituent. The update triggered by such an event involves
characterizing the event on the phonological, syntactic, and meaning
levels.
This incremental perspective is at the basis of PTT’s analyses of vari-
ous aspects of grounding, for instance back channel moves that can occur
in parallel to another interlocuter’s ongoing utterance. They are also a
crucial component of one of PTT’s signal achievements (see Poesio and
Rieser (2010)), a highly explicit account of collaborative utterances such
as utterance (1.2) in (57):
(57) 1.1 Instructor: So jetzt nimmst Du [pause]
well now you take
1.2 Constructor: eine Schraube
a screw
1.3 Inst: eine < − > orangene mit einem Schlitz.
an < − > orange one with a slit
1.4 Cnst: Ja
Yes (from The Bielefeld Toy Plane Corpus, cited in Poesio and
Rieser (2010) )
Completions generally involve guesswork by the addressee of the cur-
rent speaker’s intended next word/phrase. This guesswork becomes more
justiﬁed in a collaborative task oriented setting, as in (57). Using MCEs
and the Bratman/Tuomela theory of shared cooperative activity, PTT
oﬀers a detailed account of how completions can occur as a consequence
of incremental intention recognition. This account is one of the most
detailed existing analyses of interpretation in dialogue that integrates
grammar, updates of information states in dialogue, and rich domain–
speciﬁc information underpinning joint action.
1.5 Extensions: incrementality, learning, and
entrainment
In this section I consider some dialogue phenomena that have not as yet
been studied extensively, but that have far reaching consequences for
our view of semantics.
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1.5.1 Self repair
Dysﬂuencies are ubiquitous and observable in all but the briefest con-
versational interaction. Dysﬂuencies have been studied by researchers
in CA (Schegloﬀ et al. (1977)), in great detail by psycholinguists (e.g.
Levelt (1983); Brennan and Schober (2001); Clark and FoxTree (2002);
Bailey and Ferreira (2007)), and by computational linguists working on
speech applications (e.g. Shriberg (1994); Heeman and Allen (1999)). To
date, they have mostly been excluded from semantic analysis, primarily
because they have been assumed to constitute low level ‘noise’, with-
out semantic import. In fact, dysﬂuencies participate in semantic and
pragmatic processes such as anaphora, conversational implicature, and
discourse particles, as illustrated in (58). In all three cases, the semantic
process is dependent on the reparandum (the phrase to be repaired) as
the antecedent:
(58) a. Peter was + { well } he was ] ﬁred. (Example from Heeman and
Allen (1999))
b. A: Because I, [ [ [ any, + anyone, ] + any friend, ] + anyone ]
I give my number to is welcome to call me (Example from the
Switchboard corpus) (implicature: ‘It’s not just her friends that
are welcome to call her when A gives them her number’)
c. From yellow down to brown - NO - that’s red. (Example from
Levelt (1983))
They also provide a particularly natural example of self-addressed
queries, queries where the intended responder is the original querier:
(59) a. Carol: Well it’s (pause) it’s (pause) er (pause) what’s his name?
Bernard Matthews’ turkey roast. (BNC, KBJ)
b. A: Here we are in this place, what’s its name? Australia.
Since they can occur at just about any location in a given utterance
and their eﬀect is local, dysﬂuencies provide strong motivation for an
incremental semantics, that is, a semantics calculated on a word-by-
word, left to right fashion (see e.g. Steedman (1999); Morrill (2000);
Kempson et al. (2000)). Moreover, they require the content construction
process to be non-monotonic, since initial decisions can be overriden as
a result of self-repair.
Ginzburg et al. (2014) show how, given an incremental dialogue se-
mantics, accommodating dysﬂuencies is a straightforward extension of
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the account discussed in section 45 for clariﬁcation interaction: the mon-
itoring and update/clariﬁcation cycle is modiﬁed to happen at the end
of each word utterance event, and in case of the need for repair, a re-
pair question gets accommodated into QUD. Overt examples for such
accommodation is exempliﬁed in (59).
1.5.2 Learning
The lion’s share of contemporary semantic work operates under the as-
sumption that one is analyzing language qua static, shared entity, albeit
one where a given form can convey radically distinct contents due to the
constantly shifting context. The pervasive nature of metacommunica-
tive interaction, discussed in sections 1.3.3, 45, and 1.5.1, indicate that
we cannot maintain the simplifying assumption about a shared linguis-
tic entity. For the child and the foreigner it is clear that the linguistic
entity needs to be treated as dynamic. But of course the same is true
for a mature speaker—in (60) Boris’ lexicon changes, and just like the
emergence of non-linguistic shared knowledge he can subsequently take
the new knowledge for granted. Note that, in contrast to most (adult)
clariﬁcation interaction, at issue here is information about a linguistic
type, not token:
(60) Anja: My arrhythmia is causing me problems. Boris: arrhyth-
mia? Anja: Erratic heart pace. Boris: Ah. (Later) Boris: Anja’s
arrhythmia is causing her problems. Cyprian: Oh.
The importance of a dialogical perspective for language acquisition
has been emphasized in work by Clark (e.g. Clark (2012). Some formal
semantic work on learning in a dialogue setting can be found in (Lars-
son and Cooper (2009)). Learning in a dialogue setting has been the
focus of much recent computational work (e.g. Henderson et al. (2008)),
though the paradigm in which such work is set (reinforcement learning)
requires copious data, in contrast to (60) and the fast learning exhibited
by children (Ferna´ndez et al. (2011)).
1.5.3 Conceptual Pacts and mutual adaptation
I have argued above that considerations of repair and of utterance–
related presuppositions require dialogue participants to keep track of
a very ﬁne-grained record of utterances in their immediate aftermath.
An obvious issue is how to construe ‘immediate’ and what aspects of
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this ﬁne grain get retained in the longer term. Consider (61)—Belinda’s
decision to use a diﬀerent word from Alex could easily be construed as
either corrective or as reference to a distinct entity:
(61) Alex: My sweater is really quite comfortable. Belinda: I’ve never
seen this pullover.
There is a long standing debate in psycholinguistics concerning the
extent to which common ground is actually used by participants in ref-
erential resolution. Some accounts have argued for an ego-centric per-
spective as a default (the Perspective-Adjustment model, Keysar et al.
(2003)) or as a predominant factor (the Anticipation-Integration model,
Barr (2008)). But there is now signiﬁcant evidence, reviewed in (Brown-
Schmidt (2009); Brennan et al. (2010)), that dialogue participants are
aware of the history of reference acts to an entity—how the entity has
been referred to and by whom, so that changes in the means of refer-
ence are taken to be signiﬁcant. Thus, for instance (Metzing and Bren-
nan (2003)) showed in an experiment incorporating interaction between
confederate speakers and na¨ıve addressees that the initial looks by the
addressees to familiar target objects (that they had previously grounded
during interaction with a speaker) were delayed by a few hundred mil-
liseconds when the same speaker uttered an entirely new expression for
the familiar object, but not when a new speaker uttered the same new
expression. This is the basis for the notion of conceptual pacts (Brennan
and Clark (1996)) between conversational participants, pacts that are
not only partner-speciﬁc but also quite ﬂexible: the ﬁrst looks to the
target by addressees are not delayed when a new speaker used a new
expression.
Stent (2011) discusses how dialogue systems can exhibit behaviour of
this kind in restricted tasks by means of keeping track of a restricted
class of variables relating to an interaction (e.g. in a system that allows
students to review their courses, successful adaptation can be achieved
by having the system track the the form used in rating the course cur-
rently under discussion, the verb tense being used in this dialog; and the
form used to refer to the instructor.).
1.6 Conclusions
Although dialogue is the primary medium of language use, phylogenet-
ically and ontogenetically, it has yet to take centre stage in semantics.
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Studying dialogue forces one to a particularly careful study of the na-
ture of context, fundamental in much of human (inter)activity. I have
focussed here on two essential tasks for a theory of dialogue, charac-
terizing conversational relevance and conversational meaning. As far as
conversational relevance goes I have sketched both empirical and the-
oretical characterizations, which underline it has at least three quite
independent dimensions: (a) illocutionary, (b) metacommunicative, (c)
genre-based. With respect to conversational meaning, I have exempliﬁed
the existence of various classes of words and constructions, notably inter-
jections and non-sentential utterances, whose meaning is irreducibly tied
to conversational contexts and can be strongly tied to their relevance.
All formal frameworks that have engaged in detailed description (in-
cluding KoS, SDRT, and PTT) seem to share the assumption that se-
mantic analysis in dialogue requires entities representing the publicized
information, (a) one per conversational participant, (b) with signiﬁcant
internal structure, (c) tying in to a genre/task/language game, while (d)
making intrinsic reference to non-semantic aspects of utterances.
I concluded by pointing to new challenges by phenomena such as dys-
ﬂuencies, learning, and mutual adaptation, which suggest the need for an
incremental semantics for language qua dynamic entity, with long-term,
ﬁne-grained memory of interactions.
The emergent common view concerning dialogical semantics is a very
distinct picture of the nature of semantics from the standard discourse
representation view (e.g. van Eijck and Kamp (1997)), or dynamic se-
mantics view, described e.g. in (Dekker (2011)), let alone from more
classical views of semantics.
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